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THE FORMER GOVERNMENT ATTORNEY AND
THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY:
INSULATION OR DISQUALIFICATION?
Government service has long had great appeal to lawyers who wish to
acquire expertise in particular areas of the law before entering or returning
to private practice. Even brief terms of public service can provide valuable
learning experiences that enable attorneys to better represent clients before
their former agencies. At the same time, because public service is so
attractive, government agencies are able to recruit well qualified attorneys.
Thus, this arrangement, which benefits lawyers, law firms, clients, and the
government, has been encouraged, and lawyers have traditionally found it
quite easy to move between public service and private practice.'
There are, however, ethical considerations that arise when a government
attorney moves into private practice. Canon 9 of the American Bar Associ-
ation's Code of Professional Responsibility2 admonishes attorneys to avoid
even the appearance of impropriety. When an attorney leaves a government
agency to represent clients before that agency, questions may be raised con-
cerning improper influences or misuse of information to which the attorney
1. "Some firms 'freely permit and encourage' members to accept offers of employ-
ment in government service 'with the expectation (without any commitment) that they
may some day return to the firm.'" D.C. COMM. ON LEGAL ETHICS, Tentative Draft
Opinion to Inquiry No. 19, at 3 (July 12, 1976) [hereinafter cited as Tentative
Opinion], quoting Letter from a senior partner of a Washington law firm to Lewis H.
Van Dusen, Jr., Chairman ABA Committee on Professional Ethics (Apr. 24, 1975).
2. The Code of Professional Responsibility is divided into nine canons. Under each
canon are ethical considerations (EC's) and disciplinary rules (DR's). The ethical
considerations are "aspirational in character and represent the objectives toward which
every member of the profession should strive." ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY, Preliminary Statement (1974). The disciplinary rules are "mandatory
in character" and constitute the minimum level of conduct below which no lawyer can
fall without being subject to disciplinary action by the bar associations. Id. The
provisions of the Code are given effect in the courts. See Handelman v. Weiss, 368 F.
Supp. 258, 263 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (the Code is primarily an aid in determining acceptable
practices); Kesselhaut v. United States, No. 166-74, slip op. at 6 (Ct. Cl., Trial Div.
Mar. 29, 1976), remanded, No. 166-74 (Ct. Cl., App. Div. Oct. 22, 1976) (en banc)
(power to enforce the Code will be exercised whenever appropriate); In re Meeker,
76 N.M. 354, 357, 414 P.2d 862, 864 (1966), appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 449 (1967)
(courts must enforce the Code).
3. The charge of improper influence could be raised with respect to the attorney's
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was privy while employed by the agency. Accordingly, Disciplinary Rule
(DR) 9-101(B) bars a lawyer from accepting private employment in any
matter in which he or she had substantial responsibility while a government
employee. 4  This rule, coupled with similarly directed federal statutes,5
requires the disqualification of attorneys in such instances and serves to avoid
even the appearance of impropriety.
Normally, whenever any individual attorney is disqualified from handling
a matter, all attorneys affiliated with him or her are likewise disqualified.6
The rule is based upon the realization that attorneys often have a close work-
ing relationship, sharing both information and fees. Since it is difficult to en-
sure that a disqualified attorney will render no assistance to his or her col-
leagues in the handling of a particular matter, the disqualification of all affili-
ated attorneys guarantees that no indirect benefit will be conferred when a
direct benefit would otherwise be forbidden. Until very recently, however, it
was never thought that the disqualification of an attorney, solely on the basis
of former government service, should necessitate the disqualification of that
attorney's law firm. This exception to the general rule helps to advance the
public service tradition of the legal profession by facilitiating the movement of
attorneys between the public and private sectors. 7 It also avoids disruption
in some areas of the legal community by preventing wholesale disqualifi-
cations of certain firms and the attendant adverse effect on employment
opportunities of government attorneys. In such instances it has been
determined that the appearance of impropriety can be avoided adequately
by requiring the firm to "insulate" the disqualified attorney from all contact
exercise of discretion while employed by the agency or his continuing relationship with
former agency colleagues.
4. DR 9-101(B) states: "A lawyer shall not accept private employment in a matter
in which he had substantial responsibility while he was a public employee." EC 9-3
clearly indicates that the rule is intended to prevent both actual impropriety and its
appearance. Since actual misuse of influence or information is often exceedingly
difficult to demonstrate, the guidepost of "appearance" is particularly appropriate in
these matters.
5. 18 U.S.C. § 207(a) (1970) permanently bars a former public official from acting
as agent or attorney for any party with respect to a matter in which he or she partici-
pated "personally and substantially" while a public official. 18 U.S.C. § 207(b) (1970)
imposes a one-year ban on appearances by a former public official before a court,
department, or agency as an agent or attorney for any party on any matter which was
previously within his or her official responsibility. These provisions parallel DR 9-101
(B), but do not have any effect on the law firm of the barred attorney.
6. See DR 5-105(D) (1970). See also, e.g., American Can Co. v. Citrus Feed Co.,
436 F.2d 1125 (5th Cir. 1971); Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors
Corp., 370 F. Supp. 581 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975).
7. See Kaufman, The Former Government Attorney and the Canons of Professional
Ethics, 70 HARV. L. REv. 657, 668 (1957).
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with the case. These "insulation agreements," which sidestep the blanket
rule of imputed disqualification, are widely used.
8
Some significant ethical objections have been raised concerning this
practice of insulating the former government attorney rather than disquali-
fying the law firm. The matter came to a head in 1974 when the disciplinary
rule governing imputed disqualification was expanded by the ABA -to require
the disqualification of an entire law firm whenever any of its attorneys are
disqualified from handling a matter for any reason whatsoever.9 Read in
conjunction with DR 9-101(B), the new DR 5-105(D) has the apparent
effect of disqualifying an entire law firm should any attorney in the firm have
had substantial responsibility for that matter while a public servant. A literal
construction of these two rules would preclude all insulation arrangements,
thereby ending the unique treatment accorded law firms that employ former
government attorneys. Whether these law firms will continue to enjoy this
special treatment depends entirely on the interpretations given DR 5-105(D)
and DR 9-101(B). Recently there has been considerable debate over the
issue between two seemingly irreconcilable factions. In the view of some,
the rules must be construed literally to require a blanket rule of firm disquali-
fication in order to avoid the appearance of impropriety, 10 while others con-
tend that effective insulation agreements are a practical and adequate reso-
lution of the competing interests involved."
8. A former general counsel of the National Labor Relations Board has estimated
that insulation procedures prevented the disqualification of his new firm in some 300 to
400 matters. Moskowitz, Can D.C. Lawyers Cut the Ties that Bind?, Julus DOCTOR,
Sept., 1976, at 34, 35.
9. See ABA, Summary of Action and Report to the House of Delegates, 1974
Midyear Meeting 6 (Feb. 4-5, 1975). DR 5-105(D) now states: "If a lawyer is
required to decline employment under a Disciplinary Rule, no partner, or associate, or
any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, may accept or continue such employ-
ment."
10. The leading advocate of this position is Dean Monroe Freedman, former Chair-
man of the Legal Ethics Committee of the District of Columbia Bar. While Dean
Freedman was Chairman, the Committee tentatively held that whenever an attorney is
disqualified under DR 9-101(B), his entire firm is also disqualified under DR 5-105(D).
See notes 61-66 & accompanying text infra. Although the Committee later narrowly
rejected this approach, the controversy it engendered is significant because there is an
exceptional amount of movement between the public and private sectors in the District of
Columbia, and especially because the District of Columbia Bar claims that its rules apply
to all proceedings before all federal agencies in the District of Columbia, even if the
matter is handled by lawyers who are not members of the D.C. Bar. Moskowitz, supra
note 8, at 34. For additional support for a blanket disqualification rule, see Kesselhaut
v. United States, No. 166-74 (Ct. Cl., Trial Div. Mar. 29, 1976), remanded, No. 166-74
(Ct. Cl., App. Div. Oct. 22, 1976) (en banc); ETHics COMM. OF THE BAR ASS'N OF
MONTGOMERY COUNTY, OPINION No. 19 (June 21, 1976).
11. The primary advocates of this position include the American Bar Association
[Vol. 26:402
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This article will address the ethical and practical considerations involved
in the movement of attorneys between the public and private sectors. In
doing so it will look at two aspects of the problem: the relevant disciplinary
rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility, with emphasis on the
dilemma created by the 1974 amendment to the Code, and the focal issue
of whether insulation agreements are sufficient protection against abuse or,
alternatively, if a blanket rule of law firm disqualification is necessary to
avoid adequately the appearance of impropriety.
I. THE DISCIPLINARY RULES
A. DR 9-101(B)
DR 9-101(B) prohibits an attorney from accepting private employment
in any matter in which he or she had substantial responsibility while a public
employee.' 2 Embodied in DR 9-101(B) is Canon 9's admonition that even
the appearance of impropriety be avoided. 13  Although most lawyers con-
sider themselves able to maintain high professional standards regardless of
the identity of their clients or of their own previous affiliations,' 4 their actions
are viewed quite differently by an often cynical public. Many believe
lawyers to be "opportunistic" and "prepared to betray yesterday's client for
the sake of today's fee."' 5  This skepticism is exacerbated when a change
from government service to private employment is involved, because in such
a situation it is the government, and ultimately the public, which stands to
be betrayed. Accordingly, DR 9-101(B) mandates that this appearance of
impropriety be avoided by requiring the disqualification of the former
government attorney.
One aspect of the appearance of impropriety that comes into play when
a government attorney enters private practice stems from his or her knowl-
edge of confidential agency policies' relating to negotiation techniques, en-
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, see ABA COMM. ON ETHICS AND
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, OPINIONS, No. 342 (1975); The New York City Bar
Association Committee on Professional and Judicial Ethics, see note 51 infra; the
Federal Bar Association, see Federal Bar Association, Press Release (Sept. 20, 1976);
and the United States Department of Justice, see Letter from Antonin Scalia, Assistant
Attorney General, to D.C. Comm. on Legal Ethics (Mar. 23, 1976), and U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Interoffice Memorandum, Statutory and Ethical Restrictions on the Private
Practice of Former Government Attorneys (May 5, 1969).
12. See note 4 supra.
13. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Preamble (1974).
14. Tentative Opinion, supra note 1, at 12.
15. Id. at 13.
16. See generally ABA COMM. ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, OPIN-
IoNs, No. 342, at 5 (1975).
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forcement practices, or litigation strategies. 7 Any lawyer privy to this infor-
mation has a potential advantage in future dealings with that agency. The at-
torney's prior position may also place him or her in a favored position with
former colleagues in the agency. DR 9-101(B) will, however, bar only the
use of these advantages in those matters for which the attorney had substan-
tial responsibility while with the agency, and, since the Code does not forbid
the use of these advantages in other matters, they are apparently not suffi-
cient in and of themselves to raise that appearance of impropriety which the
Code seeks to prevent. What DR 9-101(B) does forbid is the misuse of con-
fidential information relating to a particular matter.
Another question raised in the movement from public to private practice
is whether the attorney has abused the power of government office to further
his or her own career.18 Many government attorneys deal on a day-to-day
basis with private lawyers, some of whom are potential employers. Those
who anticipate leaving the government at some point "are put under an
inevitable pressure to impress favorably private concerns with which they
officially deal."' 19 Conceivably it would be difficult for a government
attorney to maintain the necessary adversary relationship in dealings with
potential employers. To this extent, it has been suggested that "the greatest
risks arising from post-employment conduct may well occur during the period
of government employment, through the dampening of aggressive adminis-
tration of government policies."20  Although DR 9-101(B) prevents the
former government attorney from working on a matter with which he or she
has dealt directly while in government, it does not prohibit the attorney from
ingratiating himself or herself with a future employer by manipulating some
matters in order to gain the favor of that employer. Thus, taken alone, DR
9-101(B) is not intended to eliminate all such violations of the public trust.
It only purports to cover the most direct abuses of power.
Short of forever barring attorneys from any practice whatsoever before
their former agencies, there is no stricture by which the Code could under-
take to eliminate abuses of power and misuse of information. Nonetheless,
within the more modest and realistic scope of DR 9-101(B) are encompassed
activities which can and should be prevented. It will, for example, effectively
prevent a government attorney from bringing an action in which he or she
intends to profit by future private involvement.2 ' An attorney may not insti-
17. Tentative Opinion, supra note 1, at 10.
18. Id. at 14.
19. ASSOCIATION OF BAR OF CITY OF NEW YORK, CONFLICT OF INTEREST AND FEDERAL
SExRVICE 234 (1960).
20. Id.
21. Tentative Opinion, supra note 1, at 14. A prosecutor cannot, for example, coerce
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tute an action and later, in a private capacity, seek to either "uphold or
upset"22 that action.
The scope of DR 9-101(,B) is largely delimited by the phrases "substantial
responsibility" and "the same matter."'23 Numerous factors enter into the
determination of substantial responsibility, but the crucial one is the amount
of actual knowledge the attorney has, or could have, of the facts. While any
knowledge of specific facts is generally viewed as sufficient grounds for dis-
qualification, actual knowledge is not absolutely essential to prove substantial
responsibility if it reasonably appears the attorney might have received the
information, or if it appears that there might be an abuse of power, since even
the appearance of impropriety must be avoided. 24  The structure of the
government agency, the size of the particular division, the length of the chain
of command, the number of other positions existing both horizontally and
vertically between the attorney in question and the person primarily responsi-
ble for the matter, and the relationship of the attorney in question to the
an individual into making admissions that could serve as the basis of future civil
litigation. See ABA COMM. ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, OPINIONS,
No. 135, quoted in Allied Realty, Inc. v. Exchange Nat'l Bank, 283 F. Supp. 464, 469
(D. Minn. 1968), af'd, 408 F.2d 1099 (8th Cir. 1969).
22. ABA COMM. ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, OPINIONS, No. 37,
quoted in Hilo Metals Co. v. Learner Co., 358 F. Supp. 23, 28 (D. Hawaii 1968).
23. Prior to the adoption of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 36 of the
old Canon of Ethics barred an attorney from accepting private employment in any
matter which he had "investigated or passed upon" while employed by the government.
See ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 36. This rule was not only unnecessari-
ly broad, but also proved to be excessively ambiguous. Significant difficulties in defining
the terms "investigated" and "passed upon" demonstrated the necessity of amending the
language of Canon 36 when the Code of Professional Responsibility was written in 1970.
See, e.g., United States v. Standard Oil Co., 136 F. Supp. 345 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); ABA
COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 26 (1930). Canon 36 was trans-
formed into DR 9-101(B) of the new Code. As a disciplinary rule, it established a
minimum level of ethical conduct, any violation of which is subject to disciplinary ac-
tion. The Code does not prescribe penalties for transgressions of the disciplinary rules;
these are generally determined by the court and the bar association responsible for en-
forcing the rule. See note 2 supra.
24. "Moreover, the court need not, indeed cannot, inquire whether the lawyer did, in
fact, receive confidential information . . . . [If] 'it can reasonably be said that in the
course of the former representation the attorney might have acquired information related
to the subject matter of the subsequent representation,' it is the court's duty to order the
attorney disqualified." Emle Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 571 (2d Cir.
1973), quoting T.C. & Theatre v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 113 F. Supp. 265, 269
(S.D.N.Y. 1953). See Hull v. Celanese Corp., 513 F.2d 568, 572 (2d Cir. 1975);
United States v. Trafficante, 328 F.2d 117, 120 (5th Cir. 1964); Hilo Metals
Co. v. Learner Co., 253 F. Supp. 23, 27 (D. Hawaii 1966). Disqualification may be
required even if the information that triggers the disqualification is available to the client
through other sources. See Fleisher v. A.A.P. Inc., 163 F. Supp. 548, 551 (S.D.N.Y.
1958), appeal dismissed, 264 F.2d 515 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1002 (1959).
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person with primary responsibility are all relevant considerations. The
relative importance of the particular matter is also significant, since the
greater its importance, the more likely it is that more attorneys have had sub-
stantial responsibility in its handling. Major matters could implicate many,
whereas routine ones would affect but a few. 25 Thus, the ultimate
determination of whether an attorney has had responsibility sufficient to
warrant disqualification is the product of a myriad of considerations. 26
The scope of DR 9-101(B) is as dependent upon the definition of the
phrase "the same matter" as it is on the definition of "substantial responsi-
bility." In general, a "matter" is defined as a "discrete and isolatable trans-
action or set of transactions between identifiable parties."' 27  If the "facts,
acts or circumstances" 28 giving rise to the attorney's involvement in both the
public and private sectors are similar, then the matter is likely to be the same
even though very different claims or legal theories may be asserted. 29 Owing
to the vast array of factual situations covered by the rule the phrase is not
susceptible to more precise definition. It has, however, been interpreted
broadly, 30 so as to be consistent with Canon 9's dictate that even the
appearance of impropriety must be avoided.
B. DR 5-105(D)
Prior to 1974, DR 5-105(D) required that the law firm of a disqualified
attorney disqualify itself only when the reason for the attorney's withdrawal
25. See Kesselhaut v. United States, No. 166-74, slip op. at 28 (Ct. Cl., Trial Div.
Mar. 29, 1976), remanded, No. 166-74 (Ct. Cl., App. Div. Oct. 22, 1976) (en banc).
26. There remains some dispute as to what degree of involvement constitutes "sub-
stantial responsibility." The ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility states that the attorney must be "personally involved to an important,
material degree." ABA COMM. ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, OPIN-
IONS, No. 342, at 14 (1975). On the other hand, the Committee on Legal Ethics of the
District of Columbia Bar has stated that substantial responsibility does not "necessarily
require a showing of actual, personal participation." D.C. COMM. ON LEGAL ETHICS,
OPINION No. 16 (1976).
27. ABA COMM. ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, OPINIONS, No. 342,
at 9 n.19 (1975), quoting B. MANNING, FEDERAL CONFLICT OF INTEREST LAW 204
(1964).
28. Kesselhaut v. United States, No. 166-74, slip op. at 23 (Ct. Cl., Trial Div. Mar.
29, 1976), remanded, No. 166-74 (Ct. Cl., App. Div. Oct. 22, 1976) (en banc).
29. City of New York v. General Motors Corp., 60 F.R.D. 393, 402 (S.D.N.Y.
1973), rev'd on other grounds, 501 F.2d 639 (2d Cir. 1974).
30. See, e.g., United States v. Trafficante, 328 F.2d 117, 119-20 (5th Cir. 1964);
Kesseihaut v. United States, No. 166-74, slip op. at 12 (Ct. Cl., Trial Div. Mar. 29,
1976), remanded, No. 166-74 (Ct. Cl., App. Div. Oct. 22, 1976) (en banc). See also
D.C. COMM. ON LEGAL ETHICS, OPINION No. 16, at 3 (1976).
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was that his or her "independent judgment" had been impaired. 3 ' Originally
intended to keep different members of the same firm from representing op-
posing parties, the rule was broadened in 1974 to require that a firm dis-
qualify itself whenever one of its attorneys was forced to withdraw under any
disciplinary rule. Consequently, when an attorney now is disqualified from
a case due to prior involvement as a public employee under DR 9-101(B),
DR 5-105(D) would appear to mandate disqualification of his or her law
firm as well. 3 2 In effect, if the two rules are literally construed, law firms
employing disqualified government attorneys are no longer excepted from the
general rule that an attorney's withdrawal from a case necessitates the entire
firm's withdrawal.
The scope of the disqualifying rule is potentially great, in that DR 9-101
(B) has been broadly interpreted.3 3  A literal interpretation of DR 5-105
(D) as applied to DR 9-101(B) could have a great impact on the
recruitment practices of law firms that specialize in administrative practice
before particular government agencies.34 Such firms have traditionally bene-
fited from the expertise of attorneys with previous internal agency experi-
ence. A recently hired attorney may well have been exposed to cases
within an agency that are handled by the firm, especially if the firm
31. Prior to amendment, disqualification of law firms was keyed to DR 5-105, which
forbids an attorney "to accept or continue employment if the interests of another client
may impair the independent judgment of the lawyer." ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILTrY (1970) (amended 1974).
32. There is very little legislative history accompanying this amendment, and what
history there is indicates that the impact of the amendment was not foreseen. The ABA
Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, which proposed the
amendment, noted only that it was "self explanatory" and was made in response to
"problems we found with [the Code] in the course of our normal work." Summary of
Action and Report to the House of Delegates, supra note 9, at 8. It appears that the
Committee did not intend to amend DR 5-105(D) in the way which was actually
proposed. In its report, the Committee noted proposed changes of DR 5-105(D) by
underscoring the parts to be changed. It underscored the portion of the rule that added
the words "or any other lawyer affiliated with [the disqualified lawyer] or his firm."
However, it did not underscore that portion broadening the ban to include attorneys
disqualified under any disciplinary rule rather than just those disqualified under DR 5-
105(D). Id. Lewis H. Van Dusen, Jr., chairman of the committee, candidly admits
that the impact the amendment would have on former government attorneys who entered
private practice was unexpected. Moskowitz, supra note 8, at 34.
33. "[TIn the disqualification situation, any doubt is to be resolved in favor of
disqualification." Hull v. Celanese Corp., 513 F.2d 568, 571 (2d Cir. 1975). See notes
24 & 30 supra.
34. See note 8 supra. A former Federal Power Commission chairman claims that it
was six years after he resigned before he could handle matters before that Commission.
Moskowitz, supra note 8, at 35. Under a literal interpretation, his entire firm would
have been similarly barred.
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is a large one. Whenever the attorney has had substantial responsibility in
one of these matters, the law firm will be faced with a difficult decision. It
must cease its involvement in the matter, discharge the attorney, or face
possible disciplinary action or eventual ouster by a court.
The government itself will also be adversely affected by such a blanket
rule of disqualification. Prospective government attorneys will recognize the
employment difficulties they might have in leaving government service, and
some may choose not to enter public service for this reason. Those who do
decide to join the government with an eye toward future employment in the
private sector may be reluctant to become involved in large scale legal
matters and may choose to leave government service to avoid contact with
such matters,3 5 since any attorney participating in a large case could be
effectively precluded from practicing his specialty in the private sector for
a significant period of time.
The effect of the blanket rule, however, is probably greatest upon the
government attorneys themselves. Many will find their employment pros-
pects in the private sector drastically curtailed, depending upon the extent
of their knowledge and their potential employer's clientele. 36  Few firms
would be willing to give up a client in order to hire an "infected" attorney,
no matter how valuable that attorney might otherwise be.37 In short, a
blanket rule of disqualification of the law firm could have a devastating
impact on the longstanding tradition whereby attorneys move easily between
the public and private sectors.
II. INTERPRETATION OF THE DISCIPLINARY RULES
A. Insulation Agreements
-By and large, the legal community has rejected the notion that the
expansion of DR 5-105(D) necessitates a blanket rule of disqualification.
Rather, firms which hire a former government attorney who is disqualified
under DR 9-101(B) from a particular case currently handled by the firm
have continued their practice, often already required by internal agency
rules, of insulating that attorney from all contact with the case. Law firms
35. See Moskowitz, supra note 8, at 37.
36. To this extent, the effect of the blanket rule will be greatest upon attorneys in
those government agencies that supervise a finite number of matters on an ongoing basis.
Attorneys in these regulatory agencies may deal regularly with most, if not all, of the
companies in a particular field. See note 34 supra. If so, they may be disqualified from
an extraordinary number of matters under DR 9-101(B); a literal interpretation of DR
5-105(D) would make them virtually unemployable in the private sector.
37. See Moskowitz, supra note 8, at 35.
[Vol. 26:402
Code of Professional Responsibility
generally consider insulation to be an adequate alternative to the blanket rule
under which the entire firm would be disqualified.38 They urge that effective
insulation of the infected attorney will avoid the appearance of impropriety
without unreasonably restricting the employment prospects of government
attorneys or impairing the recruiting efforts of the government.3 9  Further-
more, because the law firms would not have to withdraw from certain matters
it is contended that insulation does much to protect the attorney-client
relationship. 4
0
Insulation involves both effective separation of the attorney from the
particular matter and warranty by the firm to the agency and to any court
involved that the insulation will avoid the appearance of impropriety. If the
agency and court agree that the plan is sufficient,41 the firm may continue
its representation in the matter as long as it abides by its insulation
agreement. The Justice Department has formulated guidelines which delin-
eate the government's concept of effective insulation.42 First, the firm must
completely isolate the attorney from all contact with the particular matter.
He or she is forbidden from discussing it with anyone in the firm, including
nonlegal personnel, and all employees of the firm must be so instructed. Sec-
ond, there must be a "reasonable basis" upon which the government can con-
clude that the insulation will be effective. This determination is based upon
such factors as the size of the firm and the ability of the remaining attorneys
to handle the matter competently. Third, the infected attorney may not share
in any of the fees derived from the matter. Finally, it is recommended,
though not required, that the firm's involvement in the matter have been
38. Letter from Lloyd N. Cutler, Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering, to D.C. Comm.
on Legal Ethics (Dec. 2, 1975); Letter from John B. Jones, Jr., Covington & Burling,
to D.C. Comm. on Legal Ethics (Nov. 21, 1975); Letter from Robert L. Wald, Wald,
Harkrader & Ross, to D.C. Comm. on Legal Ethics (Mar. 18, 1976); Letter from Sturgis
Warner, Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, to D.C. Comm. on Legal Ethics (Mar, 18, 1976).
39. Letter from Lloyd N. Cutler, Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering, to D.C. Comm. on
Legal Ethics (Dec. 2, 1975).
40. See ABA COMM. ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, OPINIONS, No.
342, at 5 (1975).
41. In the event that no court is involved in the adjudication, the agency itself
becomes vested with sole discretion to approve or disapprove the insulation agreement.
Recent experience has shown, however, that the agency may not always be a disinterest-
ed decisionmaker and it has been suggested that "some entity other than the immediate
government agency concerned should have a role in the waiver or consent process." D.C.
COMM. ON LEGAL ETHIcS, ACTION INQUIRY No. 19 (Dec. 1, 1976) (Memorandum).
The Legal Ethics Committee of the District of Columbia Bar has instructed its Code
subcommittee to consider the promulgation of standards and criteria for the waiver
decision, possibly incorporating a third party decisionmaker and requiring that the
decision be made on the public record. Id. See notes 61-66 infra.
42. Letter from Antonin Scalia, supra note 11.
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initiated prior to the hiring of the attorney. This last guideline has the pur-
pose of ensuring that the client did not approach the firm because of the
particular attorney's former position.
Insulation agreements, as an alternative to a blanket rule, have been
specifically endorsed by the American Bar Association. Soon after DR
5-105(D) was amended to require that a law firm disqualify itself if one
of its members were disqualified under any disciplinary rule, the ABA's
Ethics Committee was called upon to determine whether the rule change
mandated the blanket disqualification of a firm whenever one of its attorneys
was disqualified under DR 9-101(B) or if insulation of the attorney would
be an acceptable alternative. In Formal Opinion 342,4 the Committee
explored the policy considerations behind DR 9-101(B), as well as the
adverse ramifications of a literal construction of DR 5-105(D) and
concluded that the goals of DR 9-101(B) could be met by a "less stringent"
application of DR 5-105(D). 44  If a firm makes its own independent de-
termination that the particular circumstances will not give rise to a significant
appearance of impropriety, 45 and the attorney is insulated from all contact
with fees generated by the case "to the satisfaction of the government agency
concerned,' 46 then insofar as the ABA is concerned no disciplinary rule has
been violated.
Although the opinion shows some concern for avoiding the appearance of
impropriety, it states that such avoidance is only one, and not the most
important, policy consideration behind DR 9-101(B). 47  There appears to
be little support for this contention. 48  Canon 9, from which the rule is de-
rived, bars even the appearance of impropriety and renders questionable
the ABA's approval of insulation agreements whenever there is "no
appearance of significant impropriety affecting the interests of the govern-
ment."'49 The ABA's tolerance of certain "less than significant" appearances
43. ABA COMM. ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, OPINIONS, No. 342
(1975). The opinion was one of general scope, and "was not addressed to a particular
case." Kesselhaut v. United States, No. 166-74, slip op. at 27 (Ct. Cl., Trial Div.
Mar. 29, 1976), remanded, No. 166-74 (Ct. Cl., App. Div. Oct. 22, 1976).
44. ABA COMM. ON ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, OPINIONS, No. 342,
at 11 (1975).
45. Id. at 12.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 3.
48. The Preamble of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that disciplinary
rules are derived from the general concepts embodied in the Canons. Since DR 9-
101(B) is derived from Canon 9, which states that a lawyer should avoid even the
appearance of impropriety, the overriding policy consideration should be just that. Any
policy consideration underlying DR 9-101 (B) is, by definition, based upon Canon 9.
49. ABA COMM. ON ETHics AND PROFESSIONAL RFSPONSIDILITY, OPINIONS, No. 342,
at 8-12 (1975).
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of impropriety stands in marked contrast to Canon 9 and to a substantial
body of case law"0 and is of dubious wisdom in an area in which actual
impropriety will be particularly difficult to detect. 51
Moreover, it is arguable that current insulation practices do not effectively
avoid even significant appearances of impropriety. One major difficulty is
that it is the government agencies which will primarily determine the accepta-
bility of the agreements. The agencies are quite favorably disposed toward
insulation pacts. Some have promulgated regulations authorizing such
agreements between themselves and their former employees,5 2 and those
which have no specific regulations appear willing to consent to insulation on
an ad hoc basis. 53 In the view of the Justice Department, the government
should routinely consent to insulation agreements when the firm's
involvement with the client antedates the hiring of the attorney.
5 4
Although the willingness of the government to enter into insulation
agreements stems in large part from a valid concern over the harmful effects
that a blanket disqualifying rule would have upon its own recruiting efforts, 55
it is arguable that this willingness is also due to the practical convenience
of insulation agreements. By agreeing to insulation and waiving a firm's
50. See, e.g., United States v. Trafficante, 328 F.2d 117 (5th Cir. 1964):
The Preamble to the Canons of Ethics admonishes the members of the bar
that their conduct should be such as to merit the approval of all good men.
That conduct shoull not be weighed with hair splitting nicety. We have found
no exceptions to the exhortation to "abstain from all appearance of evil."
Id. at 120, quoting 1 THESSALONIANS 5:22.
51. The New York City Bar Association's Committee on Professional and Judicial
Ethics has also considered the issue and has concluded that the practical difficulties of a
rule requiring automatic disqualification outweigh the ethical arguments in favor of such
a rule. The committee expressed its basic approval of Formal Opinion 342 but indicated
that the ultimate discretion to waive disqualification should not be vested in the
government agency, because of the agency's potential bias in favor of disqualification.
Instead the Committee urged that administrative and legal remedies be preserved. NEw
YoRK CITY BAR ASSOCIATION, Orn'oN 889 (Dec. 5, 1976). The ABA opinion,
however, does not foreclose access to administrative and legal remedies.
52. See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. § 4.lb(4) (1975) (Federal Trade Commission); 46 C.F.R. §
502.32(c) (1975) (Federal Maritime Commision).
53. See, e.g., In re RKO General, Inc., No. 18759 (F.C.C., June 1, 1976). The Se-
curities and Exchange Commission accepts insulation agreements in well over half of
the marginal disqualification cases it is asked to rule upon. See Moskowitz, supra note
8, at 35.
54. U.S. Dep't of Justice, Interoffice Memorandum, supra note 11. The Justice
Department is on record as supporting the special exception to the general rule of
imputed disqualification. See Letter from Antonin Scalia, supra note 11. Its representa-
tive appeared before the ABA Ethics Committee to advocate this position during the
Committee's deliberations that led to Formal Opinion 342. See Letter from Lloyd N.
Cutler, supra note 38.
55. Letter from Antonin Scalia, supra note 11.
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disqualification under DR 5-105(D), the agency is able to avoid a separate
legal battle over the disqualification issue. While this procedure avoids
diversion of sometimes meager legal resources, there is some question of
whether the public trust is being adequately considered. A serious problem
is the possibility that attorneys charged with -the responsibility of making the
insulation decisions on behalf of their agencies may imprudently consent
to the agreements, realizing that a strict rule of disqualification could damage
their own future employment prospects.
The agencies' amenability to insulation agreements is exemplified by a
recent Federal Communications Commission ruling which waived the
disqualification of a law firm after a former FCC Commissioner who joined
the firm was disqualified under DR 9-101(B).5 6 In moving for the firm's
disqualification, opposing counsel had alleged that the former Commissioner
remained uninsulated for a period of 11 months after he joined the firm,
and, in fact, had discussed the matter with the firm's client and told opposing
counsel that he hoped to handle the matter personally. The FCC dismissed
the allegations as unsupported by "adequate evidence."'57 Even assuming
that the charge of impropriety was not factually supported, the allegations
certainly raised an appearance of impropriety which arguably met the ABA's
"significant appearance" criteria. The FCC, however, addressed itself not
to appearance but to whether the impropriety actually had occured. This
decision indicates that agencies may be unable to make ethical, as opposed
to factual determinations, 58 raises serious doubts as to whether the agencies
will subject insulation agreements to close and impartial scrutiny, and demon-
strates how insulation agreements may actually serve to promote the
appearance of impropriety.5
B. The Blanket Rule of Disqualification
The infirmities inherent in insulation agreements present a strong argument
for a literal interpretation of the disciplinary rules and the enforcement of
a blanket rule of disqualification. Adherents of this position assert that
insulation agreements serve only to prevent inconvenience to the government
agencies and financial loss to certain lawyers and law firms, while impairing
56. In re RKO General, Inc., No. 18759 (F.C.C., June 1, 1976).
57. Id. at 8.
58. A major difficulty inherent in allowing the agency to make the insulation decision
is that this procedure necessitates the resolution of a legal ethics issue by an entity not
designed to deal with legal ethics.
59. Tentative Opinion, supra note 1, at 20,
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the "integrity of the administration of justice."00  Among the propo-
nents of this blanket rule is a minority of the Committee on Legal
Ethics of the District of Columbia Bar Association. The Committee,
when recently presented with the identical question posed to the ABA Ethics
Committee, at first tentatively rejected the proposition that insulation
agreements sufficiently comply with the disciplinary rules. 61 Since then the
Committee has refused, by a very narrow margin, to adopt its original
position, 62 but the tentative opinion remains as a strong dissent to the other-
wise almost universal acceptance of insulation procedures.
The drafters of the unadopted opinion appeared satisfied that insulation
agreements would be reasonably effective in preventing government attorneys
from abusing their power in order to enhance a subsequent career in the
private sector.6 3 They were not convinced, however, that insulation agree-
ments could prevent favoritism being shown to the attorney or to his or her
law firm by former government colleagues, nor that the agreements could
dispel the appearance that the law firm had gained unfair advantage
because of the attorney's knowledge of agency secrets.6 4  Because of
60. Letter to the Editor from Monroe Freedman, Wash. Post, July 24, 1976, at
A-18, col. 4.
61. This opinion was a tentative response to an inquiry involving two former
government attorneys. One had been an administrative officer with a federal agency;
the other had been a lawyer with the same agency. While both were with the agency, a
10-year service contract was negotiated between the agency and a private corporation.
The lawyer testified that he probably had approved the legal sufficiency of the contract,
although he was not absolutely certain that he did so. The administrative officer rou-
tinely recommended and signed the contract. After both had joined the same law firm,
the parent company of the private corporation involved in the original contract retained
the firm. Included in the retainer arrangement was the negotiation of a proposed new
contract to replace the expiring one. The tentative opinion held that the entire firm
was disqualified from handling the matter. The result reached was especially interesting
in that the D.C. Bar has not incorporated the 1974 amendment to DR 5-105(D) into its
own Code of Professional Responsibility; thus, even a literal interpretation of the D.C.
Code would not necessitate a blanket disqualifying rule. The Committee noted that
it had not yet acted upon the amendment and stated that it chose to defer consideration
of the proposed amendment until after the "resolution of the present inquiry." Tentative
Opinion, supra note 1, at 6. The reason for such procedural maneuvering was not ex-
plained. The fact that the amendment to DR 5-105(D) had not been incorporated left
the tentative opinion without a solid base.
62. At its October 26, 1976 meeting, the Committee concluded that, because the
tentative opinion was one of such broad scope, an absolute majority of the 19 members
then in office would be required for final adoption. The vote on the opinion, announced
at the Committee's December 1, 1976 meeting, was eight in favor, seven opposed, three
abstentions, and one absent. The opinion, therefore, failed to be adopted by two votes.
D.C. COMM. ON LEGAL ETHics, ACTION ON INQUIRY 19 (Dec. 1, 1976) (Memoran-
dum).
63. Tentative Opinion, supra note 1, at 16.
64. Id. at 16-17,
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these reservations, and a recognition of the demonstrated inability of govern-
ment agencies to make impartial insulation decisions, 65 the drafters urged that
the purposes of DR 9-101(B) could only be realized by a blanket rule of
disqualification. 66
Other support exists for the proposition that insulation agreements do not
adequately comply with the Code. The Ethics Committee of the Bar Associ-
ation of Montgomery County, Maryland, has reached a similar conclusion,
holding that the law firm of a former public zoning official who had once
denied an application for the rezoning of a tract of land could not represent
the same applicant in another attempt to have the land rezoned. 67 The opin-
ion stated that DR 5-105(D) on its face makes no exceptions for former
government attorneys.68 Although the Montgomery County Ethics Com-
mittee recognized the importance of an individual's right to his own freely
chosen counsel 9 and stopped short of holding that the blanket rule of dis-
qualification applied in every situation, 70 it refused to embrace the ABA's
approval of insulation agreements.
The United States Court of Claims, which handles a significant number
of cases involving government agencies, has also recognized that insulation
is not always effective. In Kesselhaut v. United States,71 the court refused
to waive the disqualification of a law firm despite the fact that the former
government attorney had been insulated. The court carefully considered the
impact of DR 9-101(B) and DR 5-105(D) on the facts of the case, con-
65. Id. at 20.
66. One advocate of the tentative opinion enthusiastically suggested that it would "put
a big dent in the practice of law through 'connections' and would go a long way toward
having a system where disputes are resolved on the merits, not on who the lawyers are."
Marna Tucker, Editor of the Tentative Draft Opinion to Inquiry No. 19, quoted in
Wash. Post, July 8, 1976, at A-1, col. 4, A-8, col. 2. Although this is a noble goal,
it is probably naive to assume that it would be achieved by the adoption of the blanket
rule. The "connections" necessary to practice "law through connections" are usually
longstanding personal relationships which will remain unaffected by the blanket rule.
Law firms do not hire government attorneys in order to glean inside information about a
particular case; government attorneys are hired because they know their way around
a particular agency. Attorneys may have numerous agency connections and be privy to
many agency secrets, yet be untouched by the blanket rule because they have not had
substantial responsibility over particular matters.
67. ETmIcs COMM. OF THE BAR Ass'N OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY, OPINION No. 19,
(June 21, 1976).
68. Id. at 5.
69. Id. at 6-7.
70. The committee left open the question of when the blanket rule would not apply
and limited its opinion to the particular facts involved.
71. No. 166-74 (Ct. Cl., Trial Div. Mar. 29, 1976), remanded, No. 166-74 (Ct. Cl.,
App. Div. Oct. 22, 1976) (en banc).
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cluding that the firm could not continue its representation and still avoid the
appearance of impropriety. Although the Justice Department in this case
objected to the continued representation of the law firm, the court stated that
it would have required the firm's disqualification even if the Justice
Department had not objected.7 2 Kesselhaut indicates, therefore, that courts
will make independent determinations of the effect of the disciplinary rules
and may construe them literally to require a blanket rule of disqualification.
III. CONCLUSION
As is evident from the previous discussion, there are valid arguments
favoring both interpretations of the disciplinary rules, and substantial evi-
dence exists in support of each view. While it cannot be gainsaid that a
blanket rule would create upheaval in certain areas of the legal community,
neither can it be denied that experiences with insulation have been less than
satisfactory. The choice between the two ultimately comes down to the
larger question: Are we to allow an exception to a strong ethical principal
solely because of the practical hardships that would otherwise result? From
an ethical as well as a practical point of view, the answer must be no.
The Code of Professional Responsibility is clear in its requirement of the
disqualification of an entire law firm upon the withdrawal of any associated
attorney for any reason. Canon 9's mandate is unequivocal: even the ap-
pearance of impropriety must be avoided. The rule is in no way conditioned
upon a lawyer's ability to avoid personal sacrifice. The proper inquiry is not
into hardship, but into appearance. 73 'Does a law firm's continued
involvement in a matter, despite the disqualification of one of its attorneys,
carry with it the taint of impropriety? In the absence of insulation, even
the most vehement opponents of the blanket rule would be hard-pressed to
respond in the negative. The next question is: does insulation alleviate this
72. The Kesselhaut court stated that continued representation by the firm would
"damage the public confidence in the integrity of the government legal service and the
judicial process," id. at 35, because it would appear that the attorney was taking
advantage of agency secrets or had used his influence while with the agency so as to
"ground a future lawsuit in which he might be employed." Id. at 36. Accordingly, the
court held that no amount of insulation of the attorney could overcome the appearance
of impropriety.
Kesselhaut was remanded by the Appellate Division of the Court of Claims for more
detailed findings on the involvement of the attorney in the matter while he was with the
agency, his subsequent insulation from the matter, and the nature and circumstances of
the retainer agreement between the law firm and the company. No. 166-74 (Ct. Cl.,
App. Div. Oct. 22, 1976) (en banc).
73. Similarly, the inquiry is better directed at the appearance of impropriety rather
than at its actuality.
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taint? The answer, based on experience with insulation to date, again must
be an emphatic no.
In the final analysis, the only valid argument against the blanket rule is
that it will create undue hardships for certain segments of the legal commun-
ity. This criticism, however, is as much an indictment of the present inter-
pretations of DR 9-101(B) as it is of the blanket rule. Specifically, com-
plaints might be better directed at the broad definitions of the terms "sub-
stantial responsibility" and "the same matter." Interpretations of these terms
have transcended the guidelines of Canon 9 and could be more narrowly
defined without infringing upon the admonition against the appearance of
impropriety.1 4 Cast in a more reasonable light, DR 9-101(B) would require
fewer individual disqualifications, thereby leading to fewer firm disqualifi-
cations under the blanket rule.
Two final points should be made with respect to the practical effects of
a blanket rule of disqualification. It is by no means certain that the long-
term disruptive impact on the legal community of such a rule would be of
major proportions. Some reshuffling of matters, and even of attorneys,
among law firms would certainly result, and some government attorneys
might well be restrained from joining private firms until particular matters
are concluded. If current inbreeding in the legal community is so pervasive
as to lend credence to the dire predictions that have been made with respect
to the blanket rule, then perhaps a healthy restructuring is long overdue.
Moreover, it is possible that the blanket rule would in fact promote a more
dedicated caliber of government attorney. While the rule would likely affect
the government's recruiting efforts and could discourage some government
attorneys from becoming involved in large scale matters, this impact would
be restricted to those attorneys who consider government service a mere
stepping stone to eventual private sector employment. 7 1 Without disparaging
the motives of such attorneys, it may nonetheless be suggested that the
government career-oriented lawyer with a commitment to the policies and
74. Under DR 9-101(B), an individual disqualification can result if an attorney
might have merely acquired information and that information would be available to the
client through other sources. See note 24 & accompanying text supra.
75. The government itself is becoming concerned with the problem of short-term
government service and in some instances has begun imposing a minimum length of
service upon incoming government attorneys. The Carter administration is requiring
that top appointees agree in writing to a four year commitment and that regulatory
agency nominees serve a full appointive term. Conflict-of-interest Guidelines Set for
Carter Appointees, Wash. Post, Dec. 11, 1976, at A-4, col. 1. Similarly, the National
Labor Relations Board now requires that its attorneys pledge themselves to at least three
years of service with the Board. NLRB Lawyers Charge Agency With Unfair Labor
Practices, Wash. Post, Dec. 11, 1976 at A-I, col. 2.
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functions of his or her agency is likely to be the more desirable public servant.
In an age of burgeoning law school enrollment and intense job competition,
the quality of government attorneys need not suffer, and may well improve.
IV. POSTSCRIPT
In spite of the foregoing, the prospects for adoption of the blanket rule
are not good. The issue will be resolved by those lawyers who sit on the
bench and the ethics and disciplinary committees, and most lawyers who have
expressed an opinion on the subject have rejected the blanket rule in favor
of the insulation alternative.
Should the insulation agreement carry the day, it is nonetheless to be
hoped that the airing of this controversy will have an effect upon the conduct
of attorneys, law firms, and agencies confronted with the situation at issue.
The disciplinary rules, by definition, establish only the minimum level of
acceptable conduct, and the Code cautions that "[e]ach lawyer must find
within his own conscience the touchstone against which to test the extent to
which his actions should rise above minimum standards. '7 6 Accordingly,
the standards for insulation should be rigorous and the requirements of insu-
lation agreements meticulously observed. More importantly, each lawyer
consenting to, or involved in, an insulation pact must determine for himself
or herself that the agreement will effectively avoid any appearance of im-
propriety.
John B. Williams
76. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILTrY, Preamble (1974).
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